A Wargamers complete guide to the Armed Opposition
to France’s
Expansion Across the Algerian-Moroccan Frontier at
the Turn of the Century
By Ian Croxall Return
to History Index
At the dawn of the 20th century, an influential party of colonialists was obsessed with carving a colonial empire out of the barren wastes of the North African desert for their personal glory in the name of France. This was achieved through political manipulation and subtle subterfuge on the part of a handful of ambitious army officers. This activity led to a series of small unit actions in North Africa culminating in a full-scale invasion of Morocco in 1907. These actions are eminently suitable for colonial skirmishing on the wargames table.
In an effort to manage the size of this article we have stayed away from the political disintegration of Morocco during this period and also chosen to omit information pertaining to the occupation of Morocco proper and the rebellions that ensued. Perhaps this will be the subject of another article, as may the expansion into the southern Sahara and battle with the Tuaregs.
We will first present an overview of the theater. Describe the Invasion and battles that this precipitated. Introduce the combatants. Describe their weapons uniforms and tactics. Finally we will discuss some modification suggestions to The Sword and the Flame, particular to this campaign. We will present scenarios for this popular set of skirmish Colonial Wargame Rules, which could be adapted to other rules
References to "The Sword and the Flame" appear by kind permission from Larry Brom, their author.
PART I
At the end of the 19th century, France’s attentions in Algeria were turning south and westwards. The northern tribes had been mostly subdued and the last of the great resisters, Bou Amama had moved to Figuig across the uncharted border into Morocco, the last free Muslim State west of Constantinopal.
The XIX army corps operations were now expanding south into Algeria and the Sahara. The desert was conquered oasis by oasis. To these desert outposts, supply became a matter of life and death. The forts’ occupants were shut inside their mud brick tombs prevented by the local hostile tribes from doing little else but await the next supply column.
In the west, the Algero-Moroccan border was only defined for a few miles in from the Mediterranean Sea between Oujda and Tlemcen and finished just north east of Berguent. It was so defined in 1845.
South of this lay the frontier region of the Gourara, the Tuat, and the Tidikelt. France had instructed the army not to enter Morocco, but where exactly Morocco was, was not defined. Individual Kasars (fortified town or village) were stated as being either in Morocco or Algeria. The Sultan of Morocco and the Makhzan (government) had minimal influence politically in the region, and none militarily. As a descendent of The Prophet he was, however, the spiritual leader of the region. To the inhabitants of the area there was no difference between this spiritual leadership and any physical leadership. It was a failure to this that drew the French in to the conflict.
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Full Size Printable Map |
In the great Savannas south of the desert, the French were moving eastwards from Senegal in to the Chad and the region of what is now the Central Africa Republic. Although this region should be the subject of a separate article, it is important to mention it here. Soon to become French Equatorial Africa, this area was on the northern fringes of the British colony of Nigeria. Nigeria was perceived as a threat to France in this time of political trepidation following the Fashouda affair that had brought Britain and France to the brink of war.
Britain recognized Moroccan sovereignty of the Tuat. France was concerned that seizing the frontier oases this far west on the frontier would spark an intolerable diplomatic crisis with Britain. Another French motive not to be ignored was the fact that the idea of a Trans-Saharan railway had not been completely abandoned, despite the disaster of the Flatters expedition. Now that the French were on the north bank of the Niger River, a railroad would allow for the fast redeployment of French troops to the Niger where they could threaten the British colony of Nigeria in the event of war.
In 1899, Britain embroiled itself in the Boer War. The colonialists in France knew this would allow its plans to seize the oases in the Tuat go politically unhindered. So, while Britain was chasing the Boer, the French foreign minister, a staunch colonialist, hatched a plan with which to convince parliament to condone their incursion into the Tuat and the Tidikelt.
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(From Resistance in the Desert by Ross Dunn) |
The plan was for a military escort lead by Theodore Pein to guide a scientific expedition into the Tidikelt. The mission started out well with 90 cameleers, 15 horsemen and 40 goumiers. The expedition’s "scientific" intentions were under the auspices of a geologist, Flamand. A unit of Spahis shadowed the expedition under the command of captain Germain. It took them about a month to cross the Tademait plateau, which they camped at the base of, in the oasis of Foggaret ould Badjouda. Reconnaissance told them that the Tidikelt was rising up against them. Any notions that this was a scientific expedition can be dispelled by the fact that the French refused this opportunity to withdraw. The expedition approached Ingosten oasis. The kasarians (sedentary residents of the kasars) came out and stood off, chanting and riling themselves up for a fight. The French faced them but refused to be drawn any closer. After a while several hundred more Arabs rose from the dunes on either side of the French’s intended path where they had been waiting in ambush.
With 1000 screaming and chanting Arabs awaiting their approach, Flamand lost his nerve and insisted on a withdrawal. Pein argued with him for sometime insisting that the Arabs were no match for his trained Goum. With his goumiers riding back and forth in agitation waiting for the order to attack, Pein was apparently on the point of backing down to Flamand when his Goumiers received some fire form the kasarians who were now only about 100 yards away, and the battle commenced. A red rocket was fired which signaled the reserve of Spahis to join them.
The kasarians were pursued back through the un-walled town and amongst the oases. By mid morning the battle was over with at least 50 kasarians dead but family members carried off many bodies. Germain and his Spahis arrived later that day and although the battle with the Arabs was over, that between Pein and Flamand was raging.
Flamand still wanted to retreat but Pein was set to march on In Salah, the principal town (actually still a group of walled villages in 1900). Germain agreed to press on because he was out of forage for his horses and because Pein wrote him a letter absolving him of all responsibility should their further incursion into the Tidikelt have negative political repercussions. That this was a scientific mission would be hard for the French people and parliament to swallow, now that it had become openly aggressive and that its civilian leader wanted to withdraw.
Not wishing to suffer the same fate of Ingosten, the Bashaw of In Salah surrended without a fight, probably encouraged by the fact that Pein had also rounded up hostages on his way, which he intended to execute. Pein occupied the principal casbah (fortified building) and "fined" the town 10,000 francs (with which to pay his Goum).
Later that night Germain’s Spahis informed them of a large harka (war party) being assembled at In Rhar some 50 km west of In Salah. The feud brewing between Pein and Flamand intensified even further, but Pein had to restrain himself and deal with the impending attack.
Pein had spent several days strengthening the casbah of Badjouda, the center casbah of a string of five that ran north south all about 1000 – 1500 meters apart. The oases of date palms screened it from the advance of the harka from the west. As the harka approached it attempted to out flank the French position and veered around to its right to attack from the south. This large body of men, over 1000 strong was difficult to manipulate stealthily and by the time it had turned north towards the southern most casbah Pein’s lookouts had spotted the maneuver. He positioned the Spahis in the dunes and the goumiers in the casbah. As the harka approached, now on foot, they were caught in the murderous crossfire, their only cover being the mounds of dirt around the ventilation shafts of the fuggaras (underground water galleries). Pein had kept some Spahis in reserve and at this critical moment for the harka, he ordered the Spahis to attack the harka's baggage train. The harka broke and fled. The battle was won, inflicting at least 150 dead for the loss of 1 Spahis with two wounded. This was January 3rd 1900
Hearing all the gunfire from the central casbah, what little nerve Flamand had left was dwindling rapidly. He had sent dispatch riders with a series of letters to Major Baumgarten who arrived two weeks later with a company of Tirailleurs. The furious but relieved Flamand was able to leave the Tidikelt and return north.
Flamand got his side of the story in the gutter press at the expense of Pein. Later while on leave, Pein engaged Flamand in a duel, but after two shots and two misses each, they parted unsatisfied.
Baumgarten remained at In Salah, but the next excuse to further the colonial boundaries came in the form of a series of letters he sent directly to the war minister in France thereby by-passing his own chain of command through XIX corps. Baumgarten "needed" to move the 50-km west to In Rhar to provide forage for his camels, which was insufficient at In Salah.
In late January, Baumgarten finally got his permission and advanced on In Rhar. In Rhar comprised two fortresses. The kasarians sent out a few skirmishes but refused any meaningful battle with the French, who, for lack of artillery, were forced to retreat back to In Salah.
The Prime Minister was then harassed by the army to send a relief column to "rescue" the isolated garrison at In Salah. Indications were that In Salah was under imminent danger of attack from the Bashaws of Timimoun and Timmi in the Tuat who were organizing a harka (war party) against the invaders. Viewing this desert nuisance as an irritant, insignificant compared to the problems he was up against at home (he had recently been informed of a planned coup d’etat by right wing army officers) he gave the go-ahead to sending a relief column into the desert.
This mentality was to typify the French Colonial experience throughout most of its territories. Ill advised missions of no importance to France advance into economically worthless territories and subsequently need rescuing. A small garrison is left behind. A resistance is raised against them. Relief columns and rescue missions are sent in. They leave, the resistance returns. The cycle continues.
This relief mission was under the command of Colonel Clement d’Eu. It comprised two companies of Tirailleurs Algeriens, one company Legere (Bat d’Afrique), half a squadron of Spahis, two 80-mm mountain guns, a section of sappers, 1500 camels, 200 cattle and 2,400 sheep. It crossed the Tademait in three squares with the animals within the squares, the Tirailleurs on the flanks. It started out on February 24th and by March 14th was in sight of In Salah.
Unsure of what defenses they were up against, Pein disguised as an Arab and with two of his goumiers stole into the casbahs of In Rhar. This was an extraordinarily brave move on the part of Pein and his goumiers, who could have been in little doubt as to the end that would have befallen them had they been discovered. They went unspotted taking note of defenses, armaments and positions. They were able to report back that that d’Eu faced 3000 poorly armed defenders. At 5:00 am on March 19th 1900 the attack began.
The casbahs had sent screens of skirmishes into the dunes to slow the advance of the French. Pein’s Goum and Germain’s Spahis fought these back. As the defenders were pushed back to the palm groves that screened the wall, the mountain guns were brought up to the crest of the dunes and began to fire over the trees on the walls of both casbahs.
This attack was weakened by a sandstorm that blew up reducing visibility to a mere 100 meters. D’Eu had the guns manhandled out of the dunes and pushed into the palm groves, now that Pein had cleared them. At point blank range the gun at the north casbah began to pour shells into the tough walls. The gun attacking the southern fortress was having problems due to its field of fire being obstructed by a mosque that remained heavily defended.
The northern fortress was pounded for more than an hour before D’Eu considered the breach large enough for an infantry assault. The Tirailleurs and Bat d’Af stormed the broken walls shortly after 10:00. Once inside the walls, the assaulters found themselves confronted by a series of terraces leading down form the breach. The sappers were brought up and blew holes in the floors one by one allowing in the infantry to take the casbah floor by floor from the top downwards.
Back at the southern casbah the defenders were finally driven back from the mosque by about 11:30 after a very determined defense. A small breach had been made in the wall and the Tirailleurs were sent in to assault the opening. They were repulsed by the Kasarians and driven back to the mosque. The artillery piece used at the northern casbah was dragged up through the breach there and assembled on the walls of that casbah overlooking the southern fortress. It pummeled away at he southern fortress for over an hour. This was enough and at 3:00 p.m. a man emerged identifying himself as the Bashaw of Timmi and asked for terms of surrender. The defense of In Rhar was the Tidikelt's last gasp and the resistance collapsed.
D’Eu returned north one month later leaving a garrison at In Salah consisting of Tirailleurs and Bat d’Af with artillery support. In May, another column of a thousand men comprising Legionaires, Tirailleurs and Bat d’Af took Timimoun in the Gourara region without a fight. In the same month another force of 230 Spahis and Tirraileurs under the personal command of General Serviere marched unopposed throughout the Tuat. He reported to parliament that the Tuat, Gourara and Tidikelt were all pacified.
The first cycle was complete and ready to begin again.
The seeds of resistance were sprouting. It didn’t happen immediately, long enough to lure the French into a false sense of security. It took time for disparate warring tribes to coalesce into an organized force to resist a common foe. The tribes had their own differences and language barriers to cross. Eventually plans were discussed, differences put aside and a resistance grew from the Tafilalt to rid Dar El Islam (the house of Islam) of the roumi infidel.
The murmurs of discontent spread eastwards. At Timimoun, the new Arab Bureau Officer, Falconnetti was made aware that agitation was fermenting at Metarfa. On August 28th 1900, he set out for Metarfa with a detachment of Spahis. Unable to dislodge the Kasarians from the walled village, he sent to Timimoun for reinforcements. Captain Pein and his Goumiers showed up ready for action. The resisters left the Kasar and engaged the French in a series of skirmishes in the dunes around the town.
Falconnetti called for more reinforcements from Timimoun and was joined by 60 Tirailleurs and an 80-mm mountain gun.
The French prepared for the attack on the Kasarians who were still occupying the dunes. The prayers of the defenders that could be overheard disconcerted Pein’s Goumiers. It no doubt crossed their minds that they were fighting with the roumi against fellow Muslims. The ineffectiveness of the gun whose lethality was drastically reduced by the absorbing effect the sand had on the exploding shell and the line of site problems created by the dunes and the goumiers’ lack of resolve was blamed for the French’s inability to dislodge the Kasarians.
After three days of skirmishing, the Kasarians still held out in the dunes. Pein had just wanted to seize the undefended Kasar, but Falconnetti wisely overruled this as pointless. The French gave up and returned to Timimoun after losing an officer and several men.
Over the next several months, small skirmishes from raiders in the Tafilalt resulted in more losses and prompted Falconnetti to request urgent reinforcements from the north.
At Timimoun, February 1901, Major René Reibell and his complement of 160 men occupied the garrison. It was comprised of French troops of the Infanterie Légère d'Afrique (les joyeux,), Tirraileurs, machinegun sections, non-combatant, clerks, sappers, nurses and Arab Bureau staff etc. Captain Claude Quisard, second in command and 11 other officers were left in Timimoun while its overall commander General Servière took a large column, including all the artillery out on patrol as a show of force to the residents of the Tuat to the south.
Timimoun was a ram shackle village at the main oasis in the Gourara. Many of the tightly packed buildings had been knocked down to facilitate communication between the two main casbahs. The principal casbah was a mud walled fortress with 3-meter walls and a square crenellated tower at each corner. This had been designated the troops' quarters, but was in fact too small to house them all and many of the outer buildings had also been commandeered. The other, smaller, virtualy ruined casbah had become the ammunition dump.
The south wall in the main casbah was crumbled down at one section there were a number of barley sacks stacked up inside of the breach. The immediate area beyond the breach was an animal holding pen with a watch station for the Goum guards who occupied a mud brick building there.
On February 17th, the Arab Bureau officers went out with all the remaining Spahis and Goumiers to patrol Oulad, the next oasis to the north.
Major Reibell was now without any scouts, but no trouble was expected here. On the 16th, out with the main expedition under General Servière was a patrol commanded by Captain Pein. His Goumiers brought a native back from reconnaissance patrol who told Pein that a large Moroccan harka of Berber warriors was massing at Tabelbala at the base of the Hammada de Guir. Pein was about 150 km south of Timimoun, and as Tabelbala was some 400 km from Timimoun he didn't see this as an immediate threat. He sent a regular dispatch back to Timimoun which arrived back in Timimoun a week later on the 23rd.
The only problem with this, was that by the time Pein heard of the harka at Tabelbala on the 16th, it was in fact at Charouine just 40 km southwest of Timimoun (oh the joys of communication). On the morning of the 18th, the harka of 1,500 Berbers was creeping up on the casbah in the dark.
A group of thirty of the toughest Berbers, self titled the Thirty Thieves, stole through the animal park on the south wall and managed to hide themselves amongst the stacked barley sacks just inside the breach.
As the mullah began the morning prayers, the main body of Moroccans opened up on the mud casbah. The French burst out of their billets in the pre dawn blackness and ran confused for a few minutes, bumping in to each other, clutching their boots trousers and lebels trying to figure out what was happening. The Thirty thieves added to the panic as French tried to locate their foe. Outside the walls of the casbah, taking fewer casualties, two platoons of Tirraileurs formed up on the east wall.
Inside, the French got their act together and spent the next hour picking off the Thirty Thieves until all were dead. The French and Tirraileurs pushed back the main body of Moroccans who fell back on the oasis about 1500 meters south of the casbah. The Tirraileurs outflanked the retreating Moroccans and two groups were cut off. One of the groups holed up in a building by the oasis and was attacked by the Tirraileurs who were beaten back when they began to take casualties, two of whom were their officers. The second group of thirteen took refuge in the guards' hut in the center of what was the animal park about 50 meters from the south wall.
The French poured fire on the building from the casbah for some time. The hut provided too much cover from rifle fire and Reibell called on Sergeant Vialis, commander of the garrison’s sapper detachment.
From the south wall, Vialis stood, with a cigarette in his mouth, and lit his first stick of dynamite. Tossing the stick all the way up to the building, the French waited. The building disappeared in a huge ball of dust and smoke and was completely obliterated by the huge explosion. A cheer went up from the French defenders, but as the dust settled, a furious fire came back at them from the rubble of the building. Vialis hurled a second stick, all the way into the rubble, and again a huge ball of smoke and dust erupted from the ruin. Again it was answered by a belligerent crackle of gunfire from the ruins.
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Eight sticks of dynamite were thrown
into the rubble, each time to be answered by return fire from the stubborn
Moroccans. Major Reibell called a halt to the bombing after 8 sticks had
been thrown. His secondary plan was to send in the Bat d'Af. The Joyeux,
as they were known, were as dependable as the Legion in a close fight,
but lacked their romantic reputation. The assault group consisted of 10
men and a sergeant. The Tirraileurs lined the wall of the casbah while
the assault group assembled behind a low barricade that formed the edge
of the animal pound and fixed their bayonets. The plan was to have Vialis
toss in one more stick and the Bat d’Af would charge home and finish the
day. No doubt, the assault group was nervous, or perhaps they just misunderstood
the plan, but before Vialis had time to light his cigarette, the group
rose up from their cover and charged screaming across the 50 meters of
open ground. The Moroccans managed to drop the sergeant and one other before
the charge closed home but the French finished off all the regaining Moroccan
defenders with their bayonets without further loss.
The final toll was 153 Moroccan dead. French counted 9 dead and 21 wounded most from within the casbah. Among the dead, in the courtyard was Captain Quisard. In his diary was found the complaint that after a 10 years in Africa, he had still not fired a shot in anger. C'est la vie. |
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Hearing of the attack at Timimoun, Serviere sent Pein and his goumiers in pursuit. Heading northwest towards the Wad Saoura, Pein’s men entered the southeast end of the oasis of Charouine. Charouine was surrounded on three sides by an escarpment. Pein sent up lookouts that saw the harka pouring out of the oasis and heading to towards him. Pein retreated back to Serviere who was trying to catch up but was hampered by his slow moving supply train. He eventually abandoned the baggage and forced marched to Charouine. Serviere did not press his advantage and spent 3 days positioning his Tirailleurs and guns on the edge of the plateau overlooking the oasis on three sides. The harka did not wait and beat a hasty retreat out of the oasis into the dunes to the Northwest and headed for the Saoura.
Pein and his Goum supported by Tirailleurs set off in pursuit. They eventually caught up with a large portion of the Harka holed up in a depression in the dunes. The harka leaving the depression again retreated up into the dunes. Pein’s Goums pursued, but as they charged up the sand hill the Moroccans appeared at the crest all around them and fired into them. The Goums retreated back into the depression and sough cover behind what little clumps of brush were available. For two hours they held off, hoping for relief from Serviere that never came. They were eventually driven back into the oasis with 25 men and 2 officers dead, with another 41 wounded. To add to this a significant number of his Goums and the Tirailleurs had deserted.
The French protected their hard won real estate by building a series of forts and blockhouses along the frontier roughly delineated by the wad Zousfana and wad Saoura. This left them in an intolerable situation of having a supply rout that ran parallel to the frontier. It led to a series of skirmishes over the next few years. The army would send its supply columns down the frontier. Attacks would be launched against them. The army was forbidden to attack towns in Morocco or pursue raids into Morocco across the Hammada de Guir.
The French were split into three separate groups as the majority of the mules and camels stampeded. The second in command, a popular Danish subaltern named Selchauhansen formed his group into a square but was killed soon afterwards. During the seven-hour battle the three groups eventually managed to recombine behind a makeshift wall of dead mules. The French held off several hand to hand chargers. Vauchez himself received a mortal chest wound but continued to direct fire and command the defense against seemingly impossible odds. Towards the evening the tribesmen broke off their attack Vauchez had managed at the start of the attack to send dispatch riders ahead and behind to contact other detachments of the column. It was the impending arrival of a mounted relief unit from the 1st regiment in the third echelon that saw off the attack. Vauchez died of his wounds and was buried on the field of battle along with Selchauhansen and 34 of their men. Almost all of the Legionaires were wounded, but 47 of these survived.
In an attempt to turn the tide, the brilliant Colonel Lyautey was posted to command the Ain Sefra sector. He established the bases along the frontier and from the forts at Bechar, Berguent and Forthassa. He continually harried the Moroccans across the border despite orders to the contrary form France, forcing the Arab and Berbers further westwards
An Overview of the Inhabitants of South Eastern Morocco
The indigenous people of the region can be broadly categorized into three distinct groups. Those sedentary people that populated the oases and Kasars of the region, the semi nomadic pastoral communities that lived near to sedentary groups and the true nomads. In this simplified overview we will consider the sedentary agriculturists as a group compared to that of the non-sedentary pastoralist tent dwellers as another.
Looking at the map of the region, there is a distinct ethnographic delineation between the Berber speaking tribes in the region to the west of the Hammada de Guir and the Arab tribes to the east. However the transhumant (seasonal movement of livestock) practices of the pastoralist tribes caused overlapping of this boundary.
The Military and Political System of the Dawi Mani’ and the Ait Atta
These two tribes were the most notable in their resistance to French Colonialism in the region. Their combined territories where the object of French annexation to Algeria in 1900. The Dawi Mani’ were Arabs and the Ait Atta Berbers. They shared many common attributes that distinguished them form other tribes, Arab and Berber in the region. Although they both subsisted mainly through transhumant pastoralism they also engaged in caravan trading and in date and palm agriculture to a degree. Despite the involvement in agriculture, they remained nomadic tent dwellers. By the end of the 19th century the Dawi Mani’ were relying more on agriculture, therefore their attitude to outsiders became more defensive in nature. Contrastingly the Ait Atta were less involved in agriculture and expanding aggressively, attacking any weakness they encountered to expand their tribal lands.
The Dawi Mani were descended for the Ma ‘qil Arab tribes who migrated to the region form Egypt in the 11th century. The Dawi Mani believed that their military success was due to their adoption of the Khams Khmas (five fifths). The Khams Khmas was essentially the dividing of the tribes into five sub tribes each of which fielded its own military corps commanded by a ca’id. The five sub tribes were the
- Awlas abu ‘Anan
- Awlad bil Giz
- Awlad Yusif
- Awlad Jallul
- Idarasa
The head of each fifth claimed direct ancestry from ‘Addi al-Mani’ who
legend had it was the original ancestor of the Dawi Mani in the 13th
century. Other tribes in Morocco adopted the Khams Khmas but none placed
as much military importance on it as the Dawi Mani. Other tribes seem to
have evolved it more as a socio- political unit rather than a military
tactical system. It seems unlikely that "five fifths" would have proved
to be an intrinsically more successful military system than that of say
"four fourths" or whatever. Much like carrying a talisman, if it brought
military success, they were inclined to believe it was the system that
led to the success. The Dawi Mani believed that the successful rallying
of the fifths in battle was the key to their success. If they were only
able to rally three of the fifths for action, their resolve was much lower.
The public consensus was therefore that in times of military necessity,
all of the warriors of all five fifths must be brought together.
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Any spoils of battle were divided
amongst the fifths proportionately to the number of warriors in each fifth
that had taken part. The warriors within each fifth fought together in
its own corps under the command of its ca’id. The tribal war party as a
whole were under the command of an ad hoc Warlord called a Sheik who was
elected by the fifths for the duration of the battle or war. The Sheik
had absolute military authority for the duration of his election. While
the Sheiks position was temporary, that of the ca’id was often a lifetime
position. There was no overall "chieftain" of the tribe, but a representative
assembly from each fifth called a Jama’a. Each Jama’a was typically comprised
of an adult from each of the lineage’s within each clan and comprised the
wisest and most influential men.
Over and above the Sheik, elected for a military command, was the tribal "military police" system known as the Ait ‘Arabin, the people of forty. |
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The most successful direction of expansion of the Dawi Mani up to the nineteenth century had been to the south and east towards the Tuat. They displaced the Ghananma, a small Arab tribe who had been the political overlords of a group Kasars in the Zousfana valley, known as the Beni Goumi. The last raising of the fifths for battle prior to the arrival of the French was as a retaliatory raid in 1885 on the Ghananma who had attacked one of the Kasars now controlled by the Dawi Mani.
At other times the Dawi Mani formed coalition war parties with the Ait Atta and the Ghananma and attacked the Kasars in the Tuat region from which they then extracted protection money. They continued to exact tribute from these kasars up to the end of the nineteenth century. These types of missions seemed to remain the specialty of certain groups within the tribe who became adept at it.
Towards the end of the nineteenth century, this expansion of the Dawi Mani had ceased and they controlled immense areas of territory throughout the Zousfana valley. This ranged as far as the Plain of Tamlelt in the north, the Hammada de Guir in the west and the Tuat in the east and south.
There was another tribe sometimes described by the Dawi Mani as the Sixth Fifth, the Awlad Jarir. This was another Arab tribe of about 5,000 with as many as 1,000 warriors. The Awlad Jarir formed a very close association of the Dawi Mani. Despite their comparative small size, they were never subordinate nor dependents of the Dawi Mani but allies sharing equally in the spoils of war. They formed a mutual defense pact with the Dawi Mani to defend attacks from neighboring tribes.
The Awlad Jarir were divided into two constituent tribes, the ‘Asasa who were comprised of 10 lineage’s in three clans, and the Mulfalha of 7 lineage’s of a single clan. Their territory was between Figuig and Bechar. They were particularly adept at camel rearing and were renowned as professional raiders with this skill being a specialty of the members of the ‘Asasa clan.
Inter tribal warfare was a permanent occupation and internal tribal disputes were very common. Tribal leaders were often required to mediate disputes but when such mediation was unsuccessful then feuds could break out. These would often last for years and in some cases for generations. However, when outside influences required it, such as the French invasion, these disputes could be put aside and tribes would band together in a pan tribal harka.
A massive pan tribal harka was almost realized in the early part of the 20th century but never quite materialized. The degenerating political infrastructure of the Makhzan did little to congeal the efforts, as did the lack of a suitable charismatic leader.
A huge Berber tribe of some 50,000 people who could summon as many as 8,000 warriors at the end of the 19th century. The Ait ‘Atta had their own version of the Five Fifths. Being neighbors of the Dawi Mani, it is quite likely that they borrowed their structural make up from them. They believed as did the Dawi Mani, that the Khams Khmas was a source of power within the tribe and help maintain its cohesion. There was however considered to be a difference in the purpose of the Khams Khmas to the Ait ‘Atta than to the Dawi Mani. By the end of the 19th century, no specific military significance remained to the fifths within the Ait ‘Atta as it once may have done. It now served as a political unit within the tribe for the annual election of a supreme chief, the Amghar. He served as mediator between the fifths, but also led the tribe in time of war. Unlike the Dawi Mani fifths that chose their own leader (ca’id) who might remain in power indefinitely, the Ait Atta elected this supreme leader on a yearly basis. In a yearly rotation each fifth produced a candidate. The fifth that provided the candidate for that year did not vote but allowed the other fifths to vote on the candidate. This was to prevent emergence of power grabbing by tyrants.
The military unity of the Dawi Mani was not as notable amongst the Ait ‘Atta lacking as they were the formal military interrelationships between the fifths. They were however, a formidable military power and towards the end of the 19th century they had reigned with more than 300 years as the preeminent Berber tribe undergoing almost constant aggressive expansion.
When the Ma’qil Arabs arrived in Morocco in 11th century, the Berber tribes were forced to disperse. Some of these displaced tribes formed a political federation under the leadership of a warlord called Dadda ‘Atta from whom the Ait ‘Atta claim descendancy. This federation held together, resisting the Arab invasion and by the 17th century it had started to expand aggressively in pre-Saharan Morocco. It expanded through conquest and forceful occupation of the neighboring lands and on some occasions, ‘Atta war parties numbered warriors in their thousands. These large war parties were formed for specific raids or battles and were disbanded soon afterwards.
Due to the aggression of the Ait ‘Atta, a defensive alliance of other Berber tribes was formed in an attempt to check the advance. This federation, the Ait Afalman ("people who seek peace") engaged in small skirmishes and raid defenses against the Ait ‘Atta on into the 20th century. At times huge battles were fought. A French explorer, Charles de Foucauld received reports of a battle in 1884 that involved 8,600 Ait ‘Atta and 12,700 of the Ait Mirghad, part the Yaflaman federation. He reports casualties 1,600 for the Ait ‘Atta and 400 for the Mirghad. When de Foucauld was leaving, they were preparing for another battle over the Ait ‘Attas seizure of Kasars in the Wad Gheris valley.
Due to the pressure from the Yafalman federation the Ait ‘Atta expanded south and east. They gained overloardship of the Kasars that they absorbed into their territory. How the inhabitants of these kasars were treated was dependent on how they responded to the attack. Those who offered no resistance were often treated comparatively well and were often allowed to keep their belongings and property (but were of course required to pay tribute and taxes). Those who resisted may have had their possessions confiscated and turned out into the desert or simply killed outright. The working classes of the Kasars were left unhindered, as they were required to work for their new masters.
The Ait ‘Atta were the most aggressive indigenous tribe at the time of the arrival of the French in the region. They believed themselves considerably superior to the agriculturists of the Kasars whom they despised as ones who worked with dirt.
The tactics of Ait ‘Atta and the Dawi Mani against the French were essentially the same. They often combined their war parties for attacks against the French.
War parties would seek out French re-supply missions and stalk them at some distance. They would lay in wait and then open fire from long range, force the French to deploy, then ride off again and await them further on. They would do this, sometimes for days to wear them down. Finally their attacks would get closer, the horsemen charging in firing, riding back to reload then riding in again. Again, this was intended to wear down the French until it was considered the right moment and they would then attempt to charge home using sword, or occasionally spears used thrown or as a lance.
On other occasions stealth was attempted as at the partial victory at Timimoun. At other times, weakness would be sought out as at the total victory at El Moungar.
While a re-supply column was being attacked in this way, the destination fort may be under siege. There was little opportunity for them to take fortified blockhouses, which began to be protected by machineguns and artillery by the turn of the century. It was not unknown for captured machine guns and occasionally artillery to be used, but this was rare, and no means of re-supplying ammunition, other than raiding for it was available.
No uniform was used by Moroccans peoples except by small special units of the Makhzan or in rare isolated units who were often pretenders to the throne. The Arab and Berber tribes fought in their native costumes. For Arabs these were predominantly white, but contrasted with colored sashes. Berber tribes tended to be a little more colorful. Lighter cloth with dark vertical colored stripes of greens, reds and blues, but also dark brown or gray cloth with stripes of brighter colors.
Decorative silken braids were often hung over the back and shoulders, while the large shash was wound around the head and could also be wrapped in contrasting silk cloths.
Leather trappings, such as scabbards, belts, bandoleers and horse harnesses would be of leather that ranged from sand to brown to black. This was often ornately decorated with metal buckles and studs.
Horses were often decorated with colorful ornately patterned blankets, draped in colorful fabric bards and hung with tassels.
The Kasar was common to all the oases in the region. They varied greatly in size from small walled collections of a few buildings to huge city fortresses. Within the Kasars of the region, the social structure of the inhabitants can be divided into six major sub groups.
- Sherifs
- Marabouts
- Ahrar
- Haratin
- Slaves
- Jews
Native Firepower in the Desert
Firearms in use in southeast Morocco
The firearms traditionally in use by the Arab and Berber tribes of Southeastern Morocco were flintlock muskets if the style that had been in use since the 17th century. Mostly Jewish gunsmiths who resided in the kasars of the Tafilalt and Figuig regions in South Eastern Morocco manufactured them. They were made of good quality iron transported from the north along the caravan routes and were often highly ornate and of good quality.
These locally manufactured weapons supplemented the considerable numbers of European muskets imported to Morocco throughout the 18th and 19th centuries. This influx of flintlock firearms increased rapidly in the mid nineteenth century as huge numbers of surplus military flintlocks became available when European armies made the transition to percussion rifles.
Percussion rifles never gained the respect of the Arabs due to the difficulty of obtaining percussion caps, which they were unable to manufacture locally.
Issued with the Chassepot rifle in 1866,the French had their first breech-loading rifle. It was particularly notable for its consumable cartridge. This was an odd choice considering the availability of several metallic cartridges. It was, however considerably superior to its main contemporary counterpart, the Prussian needle gun. There was a shortage of available Chassepots for the French army and they were supplemented with 1866 Remington rolling block breech loading rifles purchased from the United States.
Thousands of these Remington rifles found themselves in Africa in the 1860's and 70's. As was the case throughout Africa, the introduction of new weaponry led to a flood of replaced obsolescent weapons appearing in the hands of the indigenous populations. The introduction of the French Gras rifle and carbine in 1874 and the British Martini Henry in 1871 resulted in large numbers of their predecessors, the Remington (and to a lesser extent, the Chassepot) and the British Snider Rifle being issued to trained native armies in Africa.
The new rifles differed in that they were dedicated purpose built metallic cartridge breech-loaders as opposed to conversions of earlier muzzleloaders. Although a few numbers of Snider, and eventually Martini Henry Rifles made their way to the Arab tribes of Morocco, it was the Remington that showed up in the largest numbers.
The Sultan of Morocco, Mawlay Hassan, along with his successors purchased thousands of these rifles from the Europeans. These eventually filtered across the Atlas Mountains to the Desert fringe tribes, many of which were armed by the Sultan as auxiliaries to the Makhzan (Moroccan government). These auxiliaries usually kept the rifles with which they were issued or sold them to neighboring tribes. This natural supply was significantly augmented by Spanish and British gun runners against whom the Makhzan were notably ineffectual.
The Gras stayed in service with the French until 1885 when the Lebel replaced it, and the British similarly progressed from the Martini Henry in 1888. The magazine fed 9 shot Lebel rifle was a significant change for the French. It was built around the French invention of the new smokeless powder and contained a tubular magazine running below and along the length of the barrel. The smokeless powder had the obvious advantages in that clouds of thick white smoke during combat did not obscure the enemy. The other notable and often overlooked advantage of this smaller caliber is the hugely greater grazing zone. It did not take the military powers throughout Europe to realize the advantages of this. With its flatter trajectory, the path at which the bullet travels at the height of a man is much greater that with the more pronounced parabolic trajectory of the slower larger caliber bullets of the preceding rifles. This meant that at greater ranges, the bullet did not rise above head height reducing the element of error previously encountered with inaccurate estimating of ranges.
The Lebel was only used by the Arabs in limited numbers and the only way they usually fell into their hands was through successful ambushes and the raiding of supply trains. The other problem was that the Arabs had no way to reload the cartridges as smokeless powder was beyond their manufacturing capabilities.
Black powder was imported, but the Arabs also had the ability to manufacture it locally. They reloaded the empty cases, with locally made bullets and made percussive primers out of smuggled gasoline and powdered match heads. These were undoubtedly inferior to European factory ammunition but sufficed when it was not available.
By the 1880's there was no real reason for a warrior to continue to carry a flintlock riffle unless he wanted to. At the turn of the century the Remingtons and other breach loading rifles and a few repeaters were available in huge numbers despite the fact that selling anything to the Arabs other than flintlocks was forbidden by the French in Algeria. A magazine fed rifle that did make its way to Morocco in notable numbers was the Winchester repeating rifle. This American firearm was easy for the Arabs to reload for.
A French study of firearms in the frontier region produced the following results in 1894 concluding that the Remington model rifle was the most available rifle in the region.
